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Further Reflections on the
Iowa Black Suffrage Victory
HUBERT H . WUBBEN
Having read Robert Dykstra's defense of the Iowa Republicans
{Annals of Iowa 47 (Summer 1984), 430-450), I am better in-
formed as to the forces behind their civil rights victory in 1865.
He rightly ascertains that I am somewhat skeptical about the
depth of the commitment of many Iowa Republicans at that
time to civil equality for blacks. And I do suggest that the
character of the Democratic opposition was of some impor-
tance in making it easier for the party generally to "take the
high road." But this has not led me to the stark conclusion that
the Republicans "did a good thing . . . for a bad reason," or to
believe that their triumph at the 1865 convention was a "fluke,"
"an unaccountable political accident," or that their motives
were "mysterious."
I do believe that, despite the prevalent racism among
nearly all Iowans, the immediate circumstances, shaped as
they were by changes taking place in the state from 1854 on,
favored some implicit Republican acceptance of black votes,
and beyond that, an explicit endorsement // the no-compro-
mise-against-principle minority stuck to its guns and took ad-
vantage of every opportunity which came its way. The presiding
officer of the convention provided one such opportunity with
his ruling that tabling Russell's explicit amendment to the
resolutions committee report would require tabling the entire
report. This forced the whole convention to deal with the
issue, to "face up," to listen to its most powerful orators, Hiram
Price, Henry O'Connor, and Enoch Eastman. Indeed, as Dykstra
notes, this is the kind of situation described by Thomas Petti-
grew in which committed minorities can persuade "conform-
ing" majorities to take stands which they would normally not
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take. All things considered, it seems to me that the outcome
was neither a fluke nor a foregone conclusion. Rather, it was
one of several not too sharply divergent possibilities, although
it was the one which would stimulate the most dissension.
As to my possibly being in the pessimistic rather than in
the optimistic historiographical tradition regarding the pre-
war abolitionists and the postwar Radical Republicans, four
things come to mind. They are not entirely of a piece, but they
are all at least peripherally related to the point. My students
over the last two decades have become well acquainted with
all of them.
First, there is Lord Charnwood's singularly appropriate
judgment that "the North would have been depraved had it
not bred abolitionists." Second, if William Lloyd Garrison and
Thaddeus Stevens had been fighting to free white slaves and
to enhance the condition of white freedmen, statues honoring
them would pose severe traffic hazards in the main streets of
hundreds of American communities from coast to coast. Third,
without passage of the 14th and 15th amendments to the United
States Constitution, regardless of the mixed motives of some
of their proponents, the racial history of this country, right up
to the present, would be a much sadder and even nastier
history than it has been.
Fourth, the late military historian, S. L. A. Marshall, once
wrote about combat infantrymen, "Don't expect too much."
Marshall was not condemning them. He simply knew some-
thing about the limits of human beings confronted with hard
choices. He knew that when the going got tough, the tough
usually did get going. But those who were less tough could not
be expected to get going on their own. They would, however,
respond to able, intelligent, forceful leadership, and do their
part. The analogy is hardly exact, to be sure. Yet, to the extent
that it is, the generality of Iowa Republicans were like them;
they did their part.
A last point: I think Dykstra is correct in the last paragraph
of his text when he says: "racial inequality remains the nation's
most important unresolved problem"; in his admonition that
we need all the examples we can get of successful, relevant
political strategies to combat it; and in his suggestion that
Iowa's Republican leaders, from 1865 to 1880, employed such
strategies.
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Future historians will likely look back upon the 1980s as
a decade in which powerful elements of the national leader-
ship, following their own political imperatives, took steps which
exacerbated that problem. Latter-day Hiram Prices and Ed-
ward Russells may have their work cut out for them.
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